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The prior appropriation doctrine of water law is the framework within
which water is developed and administered in the Western United States.'
This system of water law and administration has served well over the past century to provide flexibility through the establishment of clearly defined water
rights that can be transferred among uses over time. While the doctrine of
prior appropriation has sometimes been called rigid and inflexible,' innovations have been progressively incorporated into the law, including out-ofpriority diversions and storage rights, related substitute water supply plans,
conditional rights, recognition of in-stream flow protection and recreational
uses as beneficial uses, water banks of various forms to facilitate transfers, and
(belatedly) empowering the water courts to consider water quality effects when
reviewing large transfers. 3
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1. NEILS. GRIGG, COLORADO'S WATER: SCIENCE & MANAGEMENT, HISTORY & POLITICS
143 (1st ed. 2003).
2. See, e.g., Adam Schempp, IVestern Water in the 2st Centwy: Policies and Pmgiuns
that Stretch Supplies in a PriorAppropiation World, 40 ENVTL. L. REPORTER NEWS &
ANALYSIS 10394, 10395 (April 2010) ("While adaptable, prior appropriation is rule-bound,
founded on the historical order of rights and quantity of usage. An imperfect understanding of
the amount of water historically consumed (as opposed to what returns to the stream), coupled
with the preeminent rule that 'thou shall not injure the rights of other water users,' has fortified
established practices behind a series of legal barriers, posing a significant obstacle to improving
efliciency of use."); see also LAWRENCE J. MACDONNELL, I THE WATER TRANSFER
PROCESS AS A MANAGEMENT OPTION FOR MEETING CHANGING WATER DEMAND 68
(1990).
3.
David Getches, A. Dan Tarlock, Douglass Kenney, Justice Gregory .1.Hobbs, Jr. &
Matt Jenkins, Panel Discussion at the Natural Resources Law Center's Conference (June 2007)
(outline on file with the University of Colorado Natural Resources Law Center); see abojustice
Greg Hobbs, Colo. S. Ct., How Like a River: The Evolution of Western Water Law, Speech to
the Colo. Water Workshop (July 26, 2000), in WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 155-56
(6th ed. 2009).
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Nonetheless, there remain areas in the law and its administration that result in unnecessary economic losses to water users and their communities.' For
example,- in 2006, the State Engineer shut down more than four hundred wells
in Weld County on the South Platte River in Colorado on the grounds that
the wells' pumping was interfering with surface flows belonging to more senior
agricultural surface right holders downstream, who put a call on the river.' The
shutdown resulted from several years of complaints to the State Engineer from
surface water users that the out-of-priority well pumping was not being adequately augmented.' Evaluation of the econonuic impacts of the well shutdowns showed that the losses to the well owners and linked economic activities
in Weld County greatly exceeded any potential gains to the agricultural senior
water right holders that might result from enforcing the senior rights.' The call
also precluded upstream diversions and storage by several large urban users
with more junior rights (including Greeley, Boulder, and Highlands Ranch),
substantially increasing resulting economic losses.!
Thus, the process of priority administration, which lies at the heart of the
doctrine of prior appropriation, can lead to economic losses that may outweigh the benefits from strict priority enforcement. The well shutdown case
even suggests that river calls generally are likely to be economically inefficient
since the parties who place river calls are not responsible for losses to upstream juniors. An offsetting argument is that, in the long run, river calls motivate changes in water administration and help to clarify the property rights in
water.

Still, one would expect that active water markets would correct such uneconomic results since higher-valued junior users would profit from buying the
water rights of lower-valued senior users.' After all, Colorado has had more
than a century of water market activity and has exhibited flexible legal innovations like those noted earlier.
However, efficient functioning of water markets depends heavily on two
key conditions: (i) low transaction costs; and (ii) a legal framework that creates
the potential for a wide range of transactions, in other words, sufficient market
scope." In Colorado, transaction costs create substantial barriers to market
transactions while the "beneficial use" doctrine and the closely related "anti-

4. It should be noted that water right priorities are established by the timing of initial use of
the water without regard for the economic value of benefits derived from the use of the water.
DAVID H. GETCHES, WATER LAW IN A NUTSHELL 108 (1997).
5. Charles W. Howe, Water Law and Economics: An Assessment of River Calls and the
South Platte Wel/lShut-Down, 12 U. DENV. VATER L. REV. 181, 183 (2008).
6.
Id.
7.

Id.at 185.

8. Id.
9. The term "water markets" can refer to anything from an individual fanner's sale of a
right to an adjacent town to highly organized markets like that in the shares of the Northern
Colorado Water Conservancy District. See Charles W. Howe & Christopher Goemans, Water
Transfersand Their Impacts: Lessons from Three Colorado Water Markets 39 J. AMERICAN

WATER RES. ASSOC. 1055, 1055 (2003).
10.

See HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS 15-16 (5th ed. 1999).
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speculation" doctrine substantially narrow market scope." Transaction costs
discourage potential economically beneficial transfers, while strict enforcement
of the anti-speculation doctrine can prevent the useful packaging of rights to fit
demands for water. As a result, the correspondence between water rights seniority and economic productivity of the water applied under those rights remains low.

I. TRANSACTION COSTS
Transaction costs of carrying out an appropriation or transfer (measured
by dollars per acre-foot transferred) include filing costs, possible litigation, and
the evidentiary showings (the burden of which is squarely on the applicant)
required by the court to establish historic consumptive use and non-injury to
other water rights holders." These unit costs depend on the size of the transfer
(there are economies of scale due to elements of fixed costs in the transfer
process) and on the level of controversy surrounding the transfer (partially
measured by the number of protests)." In addition to monetary costs, any delays in administrative review may prohibit fast turn-around transfers like those
needed by agriculture during drought."
Transaction costs in Colorado are also increased by a lack of basic water
rights information. Neither the State Engineer's Office nor the water courts
have publicly available centralized databases of the names of water right owners, making it difficult to contact owners. Water rights transactions and ownership are recorded at the county level like real estate transactions; however, the
lack of a more centralized system to account for water rights whose above- and
below-ground tributaries span multiple counties complicates interpreting these
records. Equally important, sale prices are not recorded, complicating the
problem of "price discovery" (figuring out what a reasonable offer to buy or
sell might be).
When an application for a change of right is filed, the owner of the right
and nature of the changes are included in the application filed with the water
court. Resumes of such applications are published monthly by the water court
11. The legal standard for speculation is the lack of a "specific plan and intent to divert ...
a specific quantity of water for specific beneficial uses." Pagosa Area Water & Sanitation Dist. v.
Trout Unlimited, 170 P.3d 307, 315 (Colo. 2007) (citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92103(3)(a)(II) (2012)).
12. COLO. REV. STAT. S 37-92-302 (2012); Administrative Order Concerning Division I
Water Court Policies (2011).
13. Charles W. Howe, Carolyn S. Boggs & Peter Buder, Transaction Costs as Detenninants of Water 7ansfers, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 393, 397, 399, 401 (1990). It is also worth

noting that if an applicant in Colorado appeals the water court's decision to the Colorado Supreme Court, the court will often request amicus briefs regarding the proposed water right or
transfer from third parties to the suit, even further delaying or adding complexity to review.
14. It seems possible, if not inevitable, that parties needing quick access to water might
attempt privately to negotiate with other water users not to oppose their applications in order to
expedite the process.
15. Ditches & Diversions, The Water Information Program of the Colorado Division of
Water Resources, available at http://www.waterinfo.org/colorado-water/ditches-diversions (last
visited Sept. 15, 2012).
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clerk, but include only limited information like the amount, priority date, location of water put to beneficial use, and general source of the water." For a water market to function efficiently, more information, such as the types of crop
irrigated and average water applications, would be useful.
In 2007, the Colorado Supreme Court appointed a committee to "review
the water court process to identify possible ways to achieve efficiencies in water
court cases through rule and/or statutory changes."" Committee recommendations included amendments to rules of procedure, educational programs for
attorneys and judges, establishment of a standing water court committee, better
materials to assist the public and individuals without attorneys, and necessary
funding for the courts and their staffing.'" While the recommendations are
undoubtedly steps in the right direction, the jury is still out on the effectiveness
of the resulting 2009 rule changes and the periodically updated set of forms
water applicants must use." Reducing transaction costs remains a challenge in
Colorado.

II. THE SCOPE OF WATER MARKETS: MARKET SIZE, BENEFICIAL
USE, AND THE SPOOK OF SPECULATION
The scope of a water market is defined by (i) the geographical extent of
the market; and (ii) the breadth of allowable transactions; the larger the number of buyers and sellers, the closer that market approaches one of perfect
competition." The greater the scope of the market, the more effective the
market will be in effecting advantageous transactions." For example, a market
that can generate transactions throughout an entire river basin is more likely to
generate advantageous transactions than one confined to a smaller watershed,
because the larger number of buy and sell offers increases the likelihood that
mutually beneficial matches will occur. Conversely, legislative proposals to
prohibit out-of-basin transfers would, if passed, also rule out advantageous
transfers."

16. See, e.g., 'WATER RESUME PUBLICATION, District Court, Water Division 1, Colo. (May
2012).
Chief justice Mary J. Mullarkey, Older Conceeirng the Estabhlshientof the I'Vater
17.
Court Conunittee of the Colondo Supreme Coul, COLO. S. Cr. OFFICE
at
available
2007),
4,
(Dec.
JUSTIcE
CHIEF
THE
OF
http://wvwv.couits.state.co.us/userfiles/File/CourtProbation/SupremeCourt/Committees/Wate
rCourtCommittee/Vater_CourtCommitteeChief.lusticeSignedOrder.pdf.

18.

justice Gregory .. Hobbs, Jr., 7iineh, Eul, andEIective Water Courts: Report to die

Ghief justice, WATER CT. COMM. OF THE COLO. S. CT. (Aug. 1, 2008), available at
http://Vw.courts.state.co.us/userliles/File/CourtProbation/Supreme_.Court/Committees/Wate
r CouiiConunittee/Final_Report_August_1_2008.pdf.
19. Id.
See Zachary Willis, Water Court Forms Again Updated by Colorado State Judicial
20.
Branch,
Colo.
Bar
Ass'n.
Legal
Connection,
January
12,
2012,
http://chaclelegalconiiection.coi/2012/01/w%,atei-court-foris-again-updatci-by-colorado-statejudicial-new-denver-basin-application-issue(d/ (last visited Sept. 17, 2012).
21.
See ROBERT D. COOTNER &THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND EcoNOMics 37 (1988).

22.

See id.

23.

See, e.g., H.B. 97-1286, 1997 61st Leg. 1st, Reg. Sess. (Colo. 1997).
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In Colorado, the scope of water markets is further limited by two closely
related doctrines that lie at the heart of appropriations doctrine: "beneficial
use" and "anti-speculation."" The origins of both doctrines historically lay in
concerns about the monopolization of unused water supplies.' Counonsense beneficial use requirements prevented early settlers from claiming entire
streams and promoted efficiency of use by discouraging "waste" and threatening forfeiture of the right." However, the doctrines have not kept up with the
times. As Professor Janet Neuman states, "the doctrinal trinity of beneficial
use, waste and forfeiture . .. is ill-equipped in its present form to achieve the
levels of efficiency that will be necessary to meet twenty-first century westem
water demands."'
In defining beneficial use, courts have used a custom-based, lowest cornmon denominator standard that fails to motivate the highest-valued uses of
water and fails to incorporate a desirable "ratcheting-up" of reasonable use
standards as better technologies become available." For example, flood irrigation should not be considered a beneficial use if economically reasonable
sprinkler techniques are available and widely accepted. One can conclude that
the water courts are not well equipped to say what is beneficial and what is not,
a determination better left to water users, water managers, and water markets.
Closely related to beneficial use is the concept of "speculation" and the
"anti-speculation doctrine." Speculation in water law has been defined as "lack
of a specific plan and intent to divert, store or otherwise capture, possess and
control a specific quantity of water for specific beneficial uses."' Insisting on
these conditions at the time of filing for a change of use can preclude economnically valuable transactions, especially the "packaging" of smaller rights to
match the supply needs of larger users. Requiring a definite transferee who has
a clear "beneficial use" for the water creates a "chicken and egg" problem in
which potential buyers will not commit to buy or lease until the change of use
is assured, while the filing requires a buyer with a clear "beneficial use."

24.
Scott A. Clark & Alix L. Joseph, Changes of Water Rrhts and the Anti-Speculaidon
Doctrine: The Continuing nipontance ofActual Beneficial Use, 9 U. DENV. WATER L. REV.
553, 562 (2006) (citing High Plains A & M, LLC v. Se. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 120

P.3d 710 (Colo. 2005)).
COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-305(9)(b) (2012); see also High Plabis,120 P.3d at 710.
25.
26. Forfeiture of rights is very infrequent in Colorado. The State has no forfeiture statute
(which, in other states, reverts the water right back to public use after a specified period of time,
regardless of the water right holders' intentions) and an abandonment proceeding, which requires a showing of intent to abandon the water right, is required to eliminate an unused right,
although abandonment is presumed if water rights have gone unused for ten years. COLO. REV.
STAT. § 37-92-103(2) (2012); COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-402(11) (2012).

27.

Janet C. Neuman, Beneficial Use, Waste and Forleiture: The Ineflicient Search for

Efliciencyin Western Water Use, 28 ENVFL. L. 919, 922 (1998).
See id. at 947-48.
28.
29. Pagosa Area Water & Sanitation Dist. v. Trout Unlimited, 170 P.3d at 315 (citing
COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(3)(a)(II) (2012)). The financial definition of "speculation" is the
undertaking of a risky business or financial position in the expectation of a commensurate gain.
In the futures markets, speculators accept contracts offered by "hedgers" wdho seek to avoid risk.
This is a vital Fimction in the allocation of risk. See VARIAN, supra note 10 at 236-39.
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For example, in High PlansA&M, LLC v. Southeastern Colorado Water
Conservancy Distric4 High Plains had acquired extensive water rights and
options on the Fort Lyon Canal in the Arkansas Basin of Colorado with the
intent of reserving the consumptive fractions of those rights for transfer to unspecified, but fairly obvious, Front Range communities." The water court denied High Plains' change of use application for these supplies and the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the denial in 2005, alleging that the exchange
application (10CW4) was speculative."
Speculators typically are parties who invest in risky situations, banking on
superior information or better-informed anticipation of future conditions to
profit from spot and forward sales or purchases." These risk takers are needed
to contract with risk adverse "hedgers" for a continuous, efficient market as
found in the grains, oil, and electric energy markets. It is reasonable to assume
that the High- Plains group made extensive investigations into emerging Front
Range water needs and the willingness of Arkansas Valley farmers to sell parts
of their water supplies. By providing a ready market for farmers who wanted to
sell some of their water and to provide an alternative source for buyers, High
Plains could have beneficially served both. But the tight constraints of the antispeculation doctrine, while considered fundamental to the pnior appropriation
system as it currently stands in the State, prevented High Plains from doing so.
The Arkansas Valley "Super Ditch" is an innovative proposal in which
participating farmers agree to fallow part of their irrigated land on a rotating
basis so that their collective consumptive use can be leased to other users for
longer terms." The project would allow water supplies to pass temporarily
from agricultural users to other users without permanent sale of the underlying
water rights." Many protests were filed against Super Ditch in Division 2 Water Court, alleging that the exchange application (1OCW4) was speculative. In

30.
31.

High Plains A & M, LLC, 120 P.3d at 715-16, 721.
Id. at 714. The HIgh Plaimscourt explained that:
High Plains applied to change water rights historically used for irrigation to any one of
over fifty proposed uses in any of twenty-eight Colorado counties. The water court
found the change application "so expansive and nebulous" that there was no way to
determine whether vested water rights would be injured by the change or to determine if there would actually be a new beneficial use made of the water. The court
found that the proposed changes were "such a deviation from the original right" that
they effectively requested a new water right. As such, the court found that the applications violated Colorado's anti-speculation doctrine, and granted the objectors' motion
for summary judgment.

Id.
32. VARIAN, suprm note 11, at 236.
33. PETER D. NICHOLS, COLO. WATER CONSERVATION BD., DEVELOPMENT OF LAND
FALLOWING-WATER LEASING IN THE LOWER ARKANSAS VALLEY I (June 30, 2011); see also
Super Ditch, THE WATER INFORMATION PROGRAM, http://www.waterinfo.org/super-ditch (last
visited Sept. 21, 2012).
34. NICHOLS, supranote 33.
35. See Chris Woodka, Jirgation Regulations Dhanw Potests Across Valley, PUEBLO
CHIEFrAIN, Dec. 28, 2009, http://www.chieftain.com/news/local/irrigation-reglations-drawprotests-across-valley/article_816422e6-8fa9-50d9-87c9-98a02b4d2ele.html.
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spite of those protests, this innovative institutional arrangement is moving
ahead.
Some have argued that the biggest impediment to successful water banks
and leasing programs like the Super Ditch is the lack of information available
to water rights holders about how the banks function." While states like California, Idaho, and Arizona have relatively active water banks, Colorado lags
behind." There is no question that the application of Colorado's antispeculation doctrine can have the effect of discouraging participation in water
banking or pilot leasing programs. Effective administration should, instead,
have the effect of injecting more information and flexibility into water markets."

I. UNEVEN APPLICATION OF THE ANTI-SPECULATION
DOCTRINE
The prohibition of "speculation" has been unevenly applied and has been
frequently circumvented. Cases cited in the Denver Post investigative series,
"Liquid Assets: Turning Water into Gold," showed that water brokers had
been able to acquire water rights for undefined future sale through temporary
application to specially formed water districts." The Hgh Plainsruling has not
prevented the formation of more special districts that accumulate water rights
for later sale to unspecified users." The United Water and Sanitation District
consists of a one-acre patch of land that can serve users anywhere in the State
while accumulating water rights for unspecified future sale." The thirty-nineacre Elbert and Highway 86 Commercial Metro District is constituted as a
statewide district that intends to build a 150-mile pipeline from the Lamar
Canal to Elbert County for unspecified users." Thus, while the State attempts
to take an anti-speculation stance, highly speculative transactions have been
able to proceed.
Conditional water rights that are typically granted to municipalities have

not been considered speculative even though some have not been perfected
for one hundred years." It is difficult to distinguish between urban planning
needs and "speculation." Additionally, many conditional oil shale rights are
more than fifty years old, while some conditional irrigation rights are over one

36.

ii

VASH. DEP'T OF ECOLOGY, ANALYSIS OF WATER BANKS IN THE WESTERN STATES,

at

(Publ'n

at

No.

04-11-011

July

2004),

available

hittps://fortress.va.gov/ecy/publications/publicafions/041 1011 .pdf.
37.
38.

Id. at 29, 37, 55, 61.
See generallyid. at 19-27.

39. David Olinger & Chuck Plunkett, Liquid Assets: Turnhg nater Lnto gold DENVER
PosT, Nov. 21, 2005, at Al.
40. Id.
41.
Id.
42.
Karen E. Crummy, Elbert County Commission Water distict soon could reach across
Colonado,DENVER PosTjuly 27, 2011, at Bl.

43. J. Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., Colo. S. Ct., Anti-Speculation and the Great and Growing
Cities Doctrine, 41st Annual Conference on Environmental Law for the American Bar Association (Mar. 23, 2012).
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hundred years old." In a real sense, every water right owner is a speculator
since water prices are broadly expected to continue increasing. Most of the
investment groups that have recently invested extensively in Western U.S.
ranchland clearly are not in business to raise cattle but to acquire water rights.

"SpeculatorsAll"
(Cartoon credit: Bruce Stark of the Balkinore Tines.)

IV. RECONCILING SOME OF THE WATER LAW-ECONOMIC
CONFLICTS
It seems feasible to work toward the reconciliation of these two major issues: (i) excessive transaction costs; and (ii) excessive application of the antispeculation doctrine. Regarding the reduction of transaction costs, scholars
and practitioners can develop presumptive values for consumptive use, timeof-use and return flows tailored for each watershed based on the many years of
court cases and related transaction data." For example, in the Rules Governing
the Arkansas River Water Bank Pilot Project, the Colorado Division of Water
Resources specifically allowed the Project to use presumptive values for consumptive use and time of use for each ditch." Presumptive values would avoid
the need for new hydrologic and agronomic studies in many change-of-use
cases. More broadly, the Colorado Supreme Court has allowed the use of
presumptive values for transfers on the same ditch."
44. Derek L. Turner, Pagosa Area Water & SanitationDistrict v. Trout Unlmited and an
Anti-Seculation Doctrinefor a New Era of Waer Supply Planning,82 U. COLO. L. REV. 639,

643 n. 20, 670 n. 181 (2011).
45. See Charles W. Howe et al., Transaction Costs as Determinants of Water Tansfel, U.
COLO. L. REV. 393 (1990).
46. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-80.5-101 etseq. (2001) (repealed 2007).
47. See, e.g., Burlington Ditch Reservoir & Land Co. v. Metro Wastewater Reclamation
Dist., 256 P.3d 645, 668, 675 (Colo. 2011) (applying a ditch-wide analysis for quantifying water

Issue 1

RECONCILING COLORADO WA 7ER IA WAND EFFICIENCY

45

Regarding speculation, the rules for water administration should allow for
"repackaging" or "bundling" of water rights to better meet the quantity and
reliability needs of potential customers-as was the intention in the High Plains
case and as is the intention of the Arkansas Valley Super Ditch Project. This
would allow us to avoid the "chicken and egg" situation mentioned earlier, that
is- a situation where the buyer will not commit until change of use is assured
but where the change of use application lacks a specific buyer. Finally, the
granting of conditional rights (in reality a form of speculation) should be tightened by limiting the life of such rights and stiffening diligence requirements to
"free up" water for other claimants and reduce the hydrologic uncertainties
currently faced by downstream water rights owners.
The issue of the inefficiency of river calls should gradually be solved
through market transactions facilitated by lower transaction costs and freed
from excessive anti-speculation restraints.

rights in the same ditch during a change case); see also David W. Baker, Future ofDitch-Wide
Change Cases in Colondo: Reducing Per-Share Water Quantities with Histoiical Consunptive
Use DetermbationsBased On UnlawlidEnlargement and Average Reservokr Releases, 15 U.
DENV. WATER L. REV. 173, 174, 187-88 (2011).

46

WATER LA WRE VIEW

Volume 16

